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CRIMINAL LAW - RIGHT TO COUNSEL - A
DEFENDANT'S PRIOR UNCOUNSELED MISDEMEA-
NOR CONVICTIONS MAY NOT BE USED TO
ENHANCE PUNISHMENT PURSUANT TO NORTH
DAKOTA'S DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE
STATUTE.
On December 8, 1982, Kenneth L. Orr pleaded guilty in a
municipal court to a charge of driving under the influence of
intoxicating liquor (DUI).' On July 6, 1984, Orr again was
1. State v. Off, 375 N.W.2d 171, 173 (N.D. 1985). Orf was charged with driving under the
influence in violation of S 39-08-01 of the North Dakota Century Code. Ste id. Section 39-08-01
provides, in relevant part:
I. A person may not drive anyovehicle upon a highway or upon public or private
areas to which the public has a right of access for vehicular use in this state if any of
the following apply:
a. That person has a blood alcohol concentration of at least ten one-hundredths of
one percent by weight at the time of the performance of a chemical test within
two hours after the driving.
b. That person is under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
c. That person is a habitual user of narcotic drugs or is under the influence of a
narcotic drug.
d. That person is under the influence of any controlled substance to a degree
which renders that person incapable of safely driving.
e. That person is under the influence of a combination of intoxicating liquor and a
controlled substance to a degree which renders that person incapable of safely
driving.
2. A person may not be in actual physical control of any vehicle upon a highway or
upon public or private areas to which the public has a right of access for vehicular
use in this state if any of the following apply:
a. That person has a blood alcohol concentration of at least ten one- hundredths of
one percent by weight at the time of the performance of a chemical test within
two hours after being in physical control of a vehicle.
b. That person is under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
c. That person is a habitual user of narcotic drugs or is under the influence of a
narcotic drug.
d. That person is under the influence of any controlled substance to a degre-
which renders that person incapable of safely driving.
c. That person is under the influence of a combination of intoxicating liquor and a
controlled substance to a degree which renders that person incapable of safely
driving.
N.D. CENT. CODE 5 39-08-01 (Supp. 1985). Orr pleaded guilty to the driving under the influence
charge and was convicted in ajamestown municipal court. Oft 375 N.W.2d ut 173. He received a
fine and a five day suspended sentence. Id.
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charged with DUI. 2 Prior to trial on the second DUI charge, the
State moved to amend its complaint to allege that the present
incident was Orr's second DUI offense and that if convicted, he
should be treated as a second offender pursuant to subsection 39-
08-01(5)(b) of the North Dakota Century Code.3 Subsection 39-08-
01(5)(b) provides that a second DUI offense within five years of the
first offense must be punished by at least four days imprisonment or
ten days community service, a five hundred dollar fine, and
evaluation at an addiction treatment program.4 Orr resisted the
State's motion, claiming that the municipal court judgment could
not be used to enhance the present charges. 5 The trial court
convicted him of driving under the influence, however, and
sentenced him as a second time offender. 6 On appeal to the North
Dakota Supreme Court, Orr argued that the State could not use the
municipal court conviction to enhance the punishment for the
subsequent DUI conviction because he was not represented by
counsel during the first trial and the municipal court record
2. Or, 375 NW.2d at 173.
3. Id; see N.D. CENT. CODE 5 39-08-01(5Xb) (Supp. 1985). Section 39-08-01(5) provides, in
relevant part:
A person convicted of violating this section, or an equivalent ordinance, must be
sentenced in accordance with this subsection,
a. For a first offense, the sentence must include both a fine of at least two hundred
fifty dollars and an order for addiction evaluation by an appropriate licensed
addiction treatment program.
b, For a second offense within five years, the sentence must include at least four days'
imprisonment of which forty-eight hours must be served consecutively, or ten
days' community service; a fine of at least five hundred dollars; and an order for
addiction evaluation by an appropriate licensed addiction treatment program.
c. For a third offense within five years, the sentence must include at least sixty days'
imprisonment, of which forty-eight hours must be served consecutively; a fine of
one thousand dollars, and an order for addiction evaluation by an appropriate
licensed addiction treatment program.
d. For a fourth offense within seven years, the sentence must include one hundred
eight days' imprisonment, of which forty-eight hours must be served consecutively
and a fine ofone thousand dollars.
Id.
4. N.D. CENT. CODE 5 39-08-01(5Xb) (Supp. 1985). For the text of S 39-08-01(5xb), see supra
note 3.
5. On, 375 N.W.2d at 173. Orr contended that the municipal court judgment could not be used
for sentence enhancement because Orr had not been represented by counsel during the municipal
court trial, and because there was no evidence in the record indicating that he had waived his right to
counsel. Id. Orr stated that he did not recall whether the municipal court judge had advised him of
his right to counsel, Id. at 174.
6. Id. Orr was convicted of driving under the influence and was sentenced to four days in jail,
fined 5500, and ordered to submit to an alcohol addiction evaluation. Id. The trial court did not state
whether Orr was sentenced as a first or second time offender, in spite of 12.1-32-02(5) of the North
Dakota Century Code. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE 5 12.1-32-02(5) (Supp. 1985). Section 12.1-32-
02(5) provides as follows: "All sentences imposed shall be accompanied by a written statement by the
court setting forth the reasons for imposing the particular sentence. The statement shall become part
of the record of the case." Id. Since the issue was not raised on appeal, the effect of noncompliance
with 5 12.1-32-02(5) was not addressed by the North Dakota Supreme Court. Orr, 375 N.W.2d at
173 n.1.
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contained no evidence indicating that he had waived his right to
counsel.' Orr contended that his sentence as a second offender
violated his right to counsel secured by the sixth amendment to the
United States Constitution and article I, section 12 of the
North Dakota Constitution.8 The North Dakota Supreme Court
reversed the trial court and held pursuant to article I, section
12 of the North Dakota Constitution that, absent a valid waiver
of the right to counsel, a prior uncounseled misdemeanor
conviction cannot be used to enhance a term of imprisonment for a
subsequent offense. 9 State v. Orr, 375 N.W.2d 171 (N.D. 1985).
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that an accused in a criminal prosecution has the right to
assistance of counsel.' 0 The United States Supreme Court
determined that the right to counsel applies to state court
proceedings in Gideon v. Wainwright." Clarence Earl Gideon was
charged with a felony in a Florida state court. 12 Gideon appeared in
court without funds and without a lawyer. 13 He asked the court to
appoint counsel for him, but the court refused and Gideon was
convicted.14 Gideon then appealed to the United States Supreme
7. Orr. 375 N W,2d at 173 The trial court hall concluded that Orr validly waived his right to
counsel in his first DUI trial, even though the municipal couit record did not reflect a waiver.. Id
The trial court's decision was based primarily on the presumptions set forth in $ 31-11-03 of the
North Dakota Century Code- Id, ie, e g, N D Cr aT Copr. S 31-11-03(15) (1976) (presumption
that an official duty has been performed iii a regular nanner) ad $31-I 1-03(17) (presuptipon that it
judicial record, when not conclusive, correctly sets forth the rights of the parties)-
8. Ocr, 375 N.W.2d at 173. see US. Cossr- amend VI, N.D, Costr art. I, 5 12- The sixth
amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in relevant part, as follows -In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shal enjoy the right to- have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense"
U.S. Co.sr. amend VI. Article I. S 12 of the North Dakota Constitution provides, in relevant part.
as follows: "In criminal prosecutions in any court whateser, the party accused shall have the right.
to appear and defend in person and with counsel." N.D Cosstv art, I, S 12,
9. Orr, 375 N W.2d at 178.79.
10. See U.S. Cossx. amend VI, For the text of the sixth amendment to the United States
Constitution. see supra note B.
II 372 US. 335(1963).
12. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S 335, 336-37 (1963). Gideon was charged wtth breaking
and entering a poolroom with intent to commit a misdemeanor, which was a felony under Florida
law, Id, see FtA_ STAT. 5 810.05 (1957) (breaking and entering with intent to commit a misdemeanor
is punishable by ip to five years imprisunmenl or a line not to exceed 1500) (repealed 1974). ad S
775.08 (a felony is any offense putishable by imprisonment in a state prison) (current version at Ft A
STAT. Ass S 775,08(1)(West 1976))
13. Gideon, 372 US. a- 337.
14. Id. V hen Gideon asked the state court to appoint counsel for him, the following
t onversation took place
The Court: Mr Gideon, I am sorry . but I cannot appoint Counsel to represent you il
this case. Under the laws of the State of Florida, the only time the Court can appoint
Counsel to represent a Defendant is when that person is charged with a capital offense.
I am sorry, but I will have to deny your request to appoint Counsel to defend you in
this case.
The Defendant: The United States Supreme Court says I am entitled to be
represented by Counsel.
Id Thejury found Gideon guilty, and the trial court sentenced him to five years Iimprisonment. Id.
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Court.1" The Supreme Court stated that an indigent defendant
must be provided with counsel in a state criminal proceeding
because the right to counsel is "fundamental and essential to a fair
trial."16
Because the Gideon decision involved a defendant charged with
a felony, many skate courts extended an indigent the right to
counsel only when he or she was charged with a felony.' 7 The
United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of an indigent's
right to counsel when charged with a misdemeanor in Argersinger v.
Hamlin. 18 Jon Argersinger was charged in a Florida state court
with carrying a concealed weapon, an offense punishable by six
months imprisonment, a $1000 fine, or both. 19 Argersinger was
convicted and sentenced to ninety days imprisonment.20 On appeal
to the United States Supreme Court, Argersinger claimed that his
conviction was invalid because the State had denied him his sixth
amendment right to counsel. 21 The Supreme Court noted a
number of constitutional problems associated with petty and
15. Id. at 338. Following his conviction, Gideon filed a habeas corpus action with the Florida
Supreme Court on the grounds that the conviction was obtained in violation of his right to counsel.
Id at 337; see U.S. CONST. amend. VI (right to counsel). For the text of the sixth amendment to the
United States Constitution, see supia note 8. The Florida Supreme Court, without an opinion,
denied relief. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 337. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
determine whether Gideon's federal constitutional right to counsel applied in a state court. Id. at
338.
16. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342; see U.S. CONST. amend. VI (right to counsel). For the text of the
sixth amendment to the United States Constitution, see supla note 8. The United States Supreme
Court accepted the proposition that "a provision of the Bill of Rights which is 'fundamental and
essential to a fair trial' is made obligatory on the States by the Fourteenth Amendment." Gideon, 372
U.S. at 342; see U.S. ConsT. amend. XIV, $ 1 (state cannot deprive any person of life, liberty or
property without due process of law). The Court, overruling past precedent, reasoned that the right
to counsel is fundamental and essential to a fair trial; because governments employ lawyers to
prosecute defendants, defense counsel is no longer a luxury, but a necessity to insure a fair trial.
Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344 (overruling Betts v. Brandy, 316 U.S. 455, 473 (1942) (holding that sixth
amendment right to counsel is not fundamental and essential for a fair trial)).
17. See, e.g., Winters v. Beck, 239 Ark. 1151, -, 397 S.W.2d 364, 364 (1965) (courts need not
appoint counsel in misdemeanor cases), crt, denied, 385 U.S. 907 (1966); State v. Sherron, 268 N.C.
694, -, 151 S.E 2d 599, 601 (1966) (defendant charged with misdemeanor is not entitled to court
appointed counsel); City of Toledo v. Frazier, 10 Ohio App. 2d 51, - , 226 N.E.2d 777, 783-84
(1967) (right to court appointed counsel applies only in felony cases); see also Rudstein, The Collateral
Use of Uncounseled Misdemeanor Convictions After &otand Badasar, 34 U. FLA. L. REv. 517, 523 (1982)
(noting that subsequent to Gideon, many courts held that a defendant's right to counsel applied only
in felony cases). Rudstein attributes the lower courts' conclusion that Gideon established a right to
couniel only in felony cases tojustice Harlan's concurring opinion. Id.; see Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335, 351 (1963) (Harlan,J., concurring) (arguing that that Court's opinion applies only to
"offenses which, as the one involved here, carry the possibility of a substantial prison sentence").
18. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
19. Argersinger Y. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 26 (1972).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 26-27; see U.S. CoasT. amend. VI (right to counsel). For the text of the sixth
amendment to the United States Constitution, see supra note 8. After his conviction, the petitioner
filed a habeas corpus action in the Florida Supreme Court, and the court, in a four to three decision,
held that the right to counsel extends only to trials "for non-petty offenses punishable by more than
six months imprisonment." Argerningr, 407 U.S. at 26-27. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Id. at 27.
22. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 28-37.
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misdemeanor offenses. 22 For example, the court noted that if a
defendant pleads guilty to a misdemeanor offense without the
assistance of counsel, the accused might not be informed of the
repercussions of the guilty plea. 23 The Court also expressed concern
that, because of the vast number of misdemeanor cases, the courts
may dispose of these cases hastily, resulting in unfair trials. 24 The
Court determined that because of these problems, the presence of
counsel was often necessary to insure a fair trial for a person
accused of a misdemeanor. 25 Therefore, the Court concluded that
"absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be
imprisoned for any offense whether classified as petty,
misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at
his trial. 2
6
Subsequent to Argersinger there was uncertainty whether an
individual charged with a misdemeanor always had a right to
counsel if the possible sentence included prison, or whether the
right to counsel existed only if the defendant was actually sentenced
to prison. 27 The United States Supreme Court addressed this issue
in Scott v. Illinois.28 Aubrey Scott was charged with a misdemeanor
theft offense that was punishable by a $500 fine, one year in jail, or
both.29 Scott was convicted and fined fifty dollars. 30 On appeal to
the United States Supreme Court, Scott argued that his conviction
was invalid because the State had not provided him with counsel at
23. Id, at 34.
24. Id
25, Id at 36-37. In discussing the necessity of counsel to obtain a fair trial, the Court stated
'The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend
the right to be heard by counsel, Even the intelligent and educated layman has small
and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable,
generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is
unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on
trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence
irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge
adequately to prepare his defense, even though he has a perfect one. He requires the
guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him Without it,
though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know
how to establish his innocence.'
Id. at 31 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932)).
26. Id. at 37. The Supreme Court noted that counsel might be necessary for a fair trial even in
petty offenses. id. at 33. The Court stated that it was not convinced that the legal and constitutional
questions involved in a case that actually resulted in imprisonment, even for a brief time, were
distinguishable from cases in which the defendant could be impisoned for six months or more. Id
27. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 368-69 (1979) (noting the conflict among lower courts
regarding the proper application ofArgersinger).
28. 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
29. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 368 (1979); see ILL, ANN. STAT. ch. 38, S 16-1 (Smith-Hurd
1969) (first conviction of theft not exceeding $150 is punishable by a $500 fine, one year in jail, or
both) (amended 1986).
30. ScoI, 440 U.S. at 368. The appellate court and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed Scott's
conviction. Id.
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trial. 3' The State contended that the sixth amendment right to
counsel should be interpreted to mean that a defendant charged
with a misdemeanor offense has a right to counsel only when his or
her conviction results in actual imprisonment. 32 The Court noted
that actual imprisonment for an offense is a more serious
punishment than fines or a mere threat of imprisonment. 33 Thus,
the Court stated that "the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution require only that no indigent
criminal defendant be sentenced to a term of imprisonment unless
the State has afforded him the right to assistance of appointed
counsel in his defense." ' 34 Therefore, the Court concluded that a
defendant does not have a sixth amendment right to counsel unless
the defendant is actually imprisoned."
The Supreme Court, however, did not determine whether a
prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction could be used to
enhance a defendant's punishment for a subsequent conviction
31. Id. Scott argued that the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted
in Argersingrr v. Hamlin, requires the state to provide defense counsel whenever imprisonment is an
authorized penalty for the crime charged Id ; st Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S 25 (1972); U.S.
COiST. amend. VI (right to counsel). For a discussion of Arcnriinger, see upra notes 18-26 and
accompanying text. For the text of the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution, see supra
note 8.
32. SeuScott, 440 U.S. at 369; US. Coss-r. amend VI (right to counsel). For the text of the sixth
amendment to the United States Constitution, see supra note 8,
33. See Scott, 440 U S. at 373, The Court stated that the central premise of Argcrinz 'r was that
actual imprisonment was a different kind of punishment than fines or the threat of imprisonment.
Id; see Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 US 25 (1972). For a discussion of Argersriger, see supra notes 18-
26 and accompanying text. The Court stated that actual imprisonment is an appropriate standard to
determine when a defendant is entitled to counsel because any other standard would create confusion
and impose substantial costs on the states. Scott, 440 U S. at 373.
34. Scott, 440 U.S at 373-74- see U.S. Co,4sr. amend XIV, 5 I (no person shall be denied life,
liberty, or property without due process of law); td. amend. VI (right to counsel). For the text of the
sixth amendment to the United States Constitution, see supra note 8. Justice Blackmun disagreed
with the contention that an indigent defendant is entitled to counsel only when he or she is actually
imprisoned. Scott, 440 U.S. at 389 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun developed a "bright
line approach," which required that an indigent defendant be provided the right to counsel when the
defendant was prosecuted for a crime punishable by more than six months imprisonment, or
whenever the defendant was actually subjected to a term of imprisonment, Id at 389-90, justice
Blackmun reasoned that this approach would provide the "bright line" that defendants, prosecutors,
and courts needed in order to determine when an indigent defendant was entitled to counsel
pursuant to the sixth amendment, Id at 390. Justice Blacknmun concluded that, since Scott's
conviction sds punishable by more than six months imprisonment, he was entitled to appointed
counsel, and therefore his conviction should have been reversed, Id.
35- StScott, 440 U.S. at 374. The question whether to provide counsel for an indigent defendant
occurs prior to trial. See, e g, N.D.R. Cit.. P. 44 (counsel shall be appointed before initial
appearance unless court has determined that conviction will not result in imprisonment)- The Scott
decision, however, states that the right to counsel depends upon whether the defendant is actually
imprisoned. Scott, 440 U.S. at 374. Thus, in determining whether counsel must be appointed, the
Scott decision forces courts to decide, before hearing the evidence presented at trial, whether
imprisonment may be imposed upon conviction. See N.D.R. CRust. P. 44. This procedure forecloses
the court's ability to consider the full range of punishments and select the sanction most appropriate
under the circumstances revealed at trial. See Scott, 440 U.S. at 383-84 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(noting that the Scott decision circumvents the court's discretion in sentencing).
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until Baldasar v. Illinois.36 Thomas Baldasar was convicted of
misdemeanor theft at a proceeding in which he was not represented
by counsel." Subsequently, Baldasar was again charged with theft
and the prosecution introduced evidence of his prior conviction so
that the Baldasar could be punished under an Illinois enhancement
statute.
38
Pursuant to Illinois law, a first conviction for theft was
punishable by not more than one year in jail and a fine of not more
than $1000. s 9 The Illinois enhancement statute provided that a
second conviction for the same offense could be treated as a felony
with a possible prison sentence of one to three years.4 0 Defense
counsel objected to the admission of Baldasar's previous
conviction, arguing that Baldasar had not been represented by
counsel at the first proceeding.4 I Nevertheless, the defendant was
convicted and sentenced to one to three years imprisonment.4 2 On
appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Baldasar argued that
his prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction could not be used to
enhance his punishment for a subsequent offense.43
36. 446 U S. 222 (1980), Although the United States Supreme Court did not address the use of
uncounseled misdemeanor convictions until Baldesor, the Court had examined the use of
uncounseledfelony convictions for collateral purposes. &e, r g, Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473, 483
(1972) (prior uncounseled felony conviction could not be used for impeachment purposes); United
States v. Tucker, 404 U.S 443. 448 (1972) (prior uncounseled felony conviction could not be
considered in the sentencing of defendant); Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.& 109, 115 (1967) (absent a
valid waiver of counsel, prior uncounseled felony conviction could not be introduced for enhancing
pnishment).
37. Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 US_ 222, 223 (1980) (plurality, per curiam). A Cook County
circuit court convicted Baldasar of misdemeanor theft in May 1975, Id The circuit court sentenced
Baldasar to probation for one year and fined him 5159 Id.
38. Id.; see I L. ANN. STAT, ch. 38, 5 16-1(eX 1)(Smith-Hurd 1977)(amended 1986). The Illinois
enhancement statute provided as follows: "Theft of property, other than a firearm, not from the
person and not exceeding $150 in value is a Class A misdemeanor. A second or subsequent offense
after a conviction of any type of theft, including retail theft, other than theft of a firearm, is a class 4
felony. " Id
39. See ILL. ANN. SmT^. ch. 38, 5 16-1(eXl) (Smith-Hurd 1977) (theft is a class A misdemeanor)
(amended 1986); id, ch. 38, 1005-8 -3(aX!), 1005-9-1(aX2) (Smith-Hurd 1982) (a class A
misdemeanor is punishable by not more than one year imprisonment and a fine not to exceed $1000)
(amended 1986).
40. ILL. ANN. SrAT. ch. 38, S 16-1(eX) (Smith-Hurd 1977) (second conviction for theft
constituted class 4 felony) (amended 1986); id. ch. 38, S 1005-8-1(bX5) (Smith-Hurd 1973) (a class 4
felony is punishable by one to three years imprisonment) (current version at ILL. ANN, STAT. ch. 38,
1005-8-1(aX 7) (Smith-Hurd) (1982). For the text of the Illinois enhancement statute, see supra note
38.
41. Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 223. The record of the first proceeding showed that Baldasar was not
represented by counsel and that he did not formally waive his right to counsel, Id
42. Id.
43. See id. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed Baldasar's sentence because the court
concluded that his imprisonment was based on his second conviction in which he was provided
counsel, and not on his prior conviction in which he did not have the assistance of counsel. Ser People
%' Baldasar. 52 III. App. 3d 305, 307, 367 N.E 2d 459, 463 (1977). The Supreme Court of Illinois
denied leave to appeal, but the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. Baldasar v. Illinois,
446 U.S. at 224.
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The Court reversed the state court judgment in a five to four
plurality per curiam opinion." Justices Stewart, Marshall, and
Blackmun wrote concurring opinions. 45Justice Stewart argued that
the sentence for Baldasar's second conviction violated his sixth
amendment right to counsel because an indigent criminal
defendant cannot be sentenced to imprisonment under an
enhancement statute unless he or she was afforded the right to
counsel at the prior trial.46 Since Baldasar was sentenced to an
increased prison term solely because of a prior conviction in which
he had not received the assistance of counsel, Justice Stewart
concluded that the sentence was unconstitutional. 47
Justice Marshall, although arguing that Scott was decided
wrongly, contended that even under the actual imprisonment
standard of Scott, the petitioner's prior uncounseled misdemeanor
conviction could not be used to impose an increased term of
imprisonment for a subsequent conviction." Justice Marshall
reasoned that, since an uncounseled conviction is not reliable
enough to support imprisonment, it is invalid for the purpose of
increasing a term of imprisonment for a subsequent offense.4 9
Justice Blackmun stated that an indigent defendant has a right
to counsel whenever he or she is prosecuted for an offense
punishable by more than six months imprisonment or when the
defendant is actually imprisoned.50 Because Baldasar's prior
conviction was punishable by more than six months imprisonment,
Justice Blackmun argued that Baldasar was entitled to counsel at
the prior misdemeanor hearing. 5' Because Baldasar was deprived
44. See Baldaya, 446 U.S. at 224.
45. Ste id (Stewart, J., concurring); id. (Marshall, J., concurring); id. at 229 (Blackiun, J.,
concurring)
46. Id, at 224 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart reasoned that Baldasar's prior
conviction, though valid because it did not result in actual imprisonment, could not be used to
impose an increased term of imprisonment for a second conviction. See id Justice Stewart reasoned
that the use of Baldasar's prior conviction to increase the term of imprisonment would contravene
the principles set forth in Scott because, pursuant to Scott, a defendant cannot be imprisoned unless he
is afforded his right to counsel. Ste id.; Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979). For a discussion
of,%ott, see supra notes 27-35 and accompanying text.
47. Baldasa,r, 446 U.S. at 224 (Stewart,J., concurring).
48. Id. at 225-26 (Marshall, J., concurring); set Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979).
For a discussion of Scott, see supra notes 27-35 and accompanying text.
49. Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 227-28 (Marshall. J., concurring). Justice Marshall contended that an
uncounseled conviction did not become more reliable because a defendant was convicted of a
subsequent offense. Id. at 228- Therefore, he concluded that a conviction that could not be used to
impose a prison sentence for a first conviction, could not be used to impose an increased term of
imprisonment for a second conviction. 14,
50. Id at 229 (Blackmun, J., concurring). The approach articulated by Justice Blackmun had
been developed in his dissenting opinion in Scott. Set Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 389 (Blackmun,
. dissenting) (1979). For a discussion ofJustice Blackmun's dissent in Scott, see supra note 34.
51. Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 230(Blackmun, J., concurring).
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of his right to counsel, Justice Blackmun concluded that the
conviction was invalid and could not be used for enhancement
purposes.
52
The Baldasar decision contained no majority opinion.
3
Interpretation of a plurality decision is generally based on the
concurring opinion stating the narrowest grounds for the holding.
54
Since Justice Blackmun's concurrence stated the narrowest
grounds, his opinion set the parameters for interpretation of
Baldasar.55  Thus, the Baldasar decision established that an
uncounseled misdemeanor conviction punishable by more than six
months imprisonment cannot be used to increase punishment
under an enhancement statute. 6
Similar to the sixth amendment to the United States
Constitution, the North Dakota Constitution guarantees a
defendant the right to counsel. 57 Article I, section 12 of the
North Dakota Constitution provides, in relevant part, as follows:
"In criminal prosecutions in any court whatever, the party accused
shall have the right . . . to appear and defend in person and with
counsel."
5 8
The North Dakota Supreme Court discussed the North
Dakota Constitution's right to counsel in State v. Whiteman.59 Oscar
Whiteman, Jr. pleaded guilty to murder after refusing assistance of
counsel. 60 The trial court's record reflected that Whiteman believed
that he could not have an appointed attorney and that he did not
have time to find one. 6' After he was sentenced to imprisonment,
52. Id
53. Id. at 224.
54. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (a plurality holding is viewed as the
position taken by thosejudges concurring on the narrowest grounds).
55. See Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 229-30 (Blackmun, J., concurring). For a discussion of the North
Dakota Supreme Court's conclusion that the opinion ofJustice Blackmun represents the holding in
Baldasa,, see infra notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
56. See Baldasar, 446 U.S. 222; see also Rudstein, The Collateral Use of Misdemeanor Convictions After
Scott and Baldasar, 34 U. FLA. L. Rav. 517, 529 (1982) (Baldasar established that an uncounseled
misdemeanor conviction punishable by more than six months imprisonment could not be used for
enhancement purposes).
57. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. VI (right to counsel) with N.D. CoNsT. art. I, S 12 (right to
counsel). For the text of the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, S 12 of
the North Dakota Constitution, see supra note 8.
58. N.D. CONST. art. 1. $ 12.
59. 67 N.W.2d 599 (N.D. 1954).
60. State v. Whiteman, 67 N.W.2d 599, 600 (N.D. 1954). On January 17, 1953, Oscar
Whiteman pleaded guilty to murder in the first degree. Id. The district court, after questioning
Whiteman, sentenced him for the crime of murder in the second degree and ordered Whiteman to
serve thirty years in the state penitentiary. Id.
61. Id. at 608. To understand the circumstances surrounding the defendant's waiver of counsel,
the North Dakota Supreme Court examined the testimony of codefendant Donald Malnourie. Id. at
607-08. The trial court had asked Malnourie and Whiteman whether they desired assistance of
counsel. Id. From the testimony of Malnourie, the supreme court noted that it was clear that
Malnourie wanted to he represented by counsel, but waived his right because he did not think he
19871
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Whiteman moved to have the court set aside the verdict and allow
him to enter a plea of not guilty.6 2 The trial court denied the
motion. 63 Whiteman appealed, claiming that he was denied his
constitutional right to counsel.6 4 The court reasoned that, for a
waiver of counsel to be enforceable, a defendant must be capable of
making an informed choice, and the choice must be made freely
and responsibly.6 5 The court stated that Whiteman's choice was not
made freely and responsibly because he desired an attorney, but
believed his desire could not be fulfilled. 66 Therefore, the court
concluded that Whiteman had been denied his right to counsel
guaranteed by the North Dakota Constitution. 67
Sixteen years after Whiteman, and two years prior toArgersinger,
the North Dakota Supreme Court addressed a defendant's right to
counsel in misdemeanor cases in State v. Heasely.68 Mr. Heasely was
found guilty of contempt of court, which was a misdemeanor
could hire an attorney. Id. at 608. Malnourie had no money, and the only property he owned, which
he did not believe he could mortgage, was in trust with the United States government. Id
Whiteman, who was in the same financial position as Malnourie, waived his right to counsel after
hearing the trial court inform Malnourie that it would not appoint counsel for him because he owned
land free from indebtedness. Id. at 610.
62. Id. at 600.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 601; see N.D. Cossr. art. I, S 12 (right to counsel). For the text of article i, S 12 of the
North Dakota Constitution, see supra note 8. On appeal to the North Dakota Supreme Court.
Whiteman argued that he was denied his right to counsel and that his conviction was "obtained by
reason of fraud and coercion, deceit, duress and other actions prejudicial to and overriding and
destroying [hisi free will." Whiteman, 67 N.W.2d at 600-01. In addition, Whiteman contended that
he had discovered new evidence that was material to his case, and which was not produced at trial.
id. at 601.
65. Whiteman, 67 N.W.2d at 610.
66. Id- at 611 (citing Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437, 441 (1948)). In Ureges .
Pennsylvania the United States Supreme Court stated:
Where the gravity of the crime and other factors - such as the age and education of
the defendant, the conduct of the court or the prosecuting officials, and the
complicated nature of the offense charged and the possible defenses thereto - render
criminal proceedings without counsel so apt as to result in injustice as to be
fundamentally unfair, . . . the accused must have legal assistance under the
Amendment whether he pleads guilty or elects to stand trial, whether lie requests
counsel or not. Only a waiver of counsel, understandingly made,.justifies trial without
counsel.
Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437, 441 (1948). The North Dakota Supret- Court noted that
Whiteman was a Native American citizen, twenty-five years of age, with only a grade school
education. Whiteman, 67 N.W.2d at 610. The court stated that Whiteman had been detained in a
hostile atmosphere, and that the trial court had not been aware of that fact. Id. The North Dakota
Supreme Court determined that Whiteman had been subjected to threats and violence by an angry
mob and by law enforcement officials, and that because of this, Whiteman felt he had no alternative
but to plead guilty. Id. at 605, 610. The court concluded that a waiver of counsel compelled by
these circumstances could not have been freely and understandably made. Id. at 610.
67. Whiteman, 67 N.W.2d at 612; see N.D. Co sT. art. 1, 5 12 (right to counsel). For the text of
article 1, S 12 of the North Dakota Constitution, see supra note 8. The North Dakota Supreme Court
vacated Whiteman's convictions on two grounds. See Whiteman, 67 N.W.2d at 612. First, because
Whitenan's guilty plea was given involuntarily, and second, because he was not afforded his right to
counsel and did not intelligently and knowingly waive that right. Id
68. 180 N.W.2d 242 (N.D. 1970).
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pursuant to North Dakota law. 69 Prior to trial, the trial judge
afforded Heasely an opportunity to obtain counsel and told him
that if he had not obtained counsel by a certain date, the court
would appoint counsel for him.70 After an unsuccessful attempt to
appoint counsel for Heasely, 71 the judge informed Heasely that he
would not appoint counsel because appointment was not
mandatory in misdemeanor cases. 72 On appeal, the North Dakota
Supreme Court determined that, pursuant to statutory law, North
Dakota courts are directed to inquire into the defendant's need for
counsel and are authorized to appoint counsel for an indigent
person.7 3 In addition, the court determined that courts must
appoint counsel for an indigent in any proceeding arising out of any
criminal case, regardless of whether the offense charged is a
misdemeanor or a felony. 74 Therefore, the court, apparently basing
its decision on stat'itory law rather than the North Dakota
Constitution, held that defendants in misdemeanor cases must be
afforded the right to counsel.75
69. State v. Heasely, 180 N.W.2d 242, 244 (ND, 1970). The district court enjoined Heasely
from asserting an interest in a certain parcel of land. Id Heasely continued to use the land, and the
owner of the property filed a criminal complaint for contempt of court pursuant to S 12-17-24 of the
North Dakota Century Code- Id. at 245; st N.D. CENT, Coos S 12-17-24 (1960) (disobedience of
court order is misdemeanor contempt) (repealed 1973).
70. Htayfy, 180 NW,2d at 246. The district court set Heasely's trial for January 7. 1969. and
Heasely was to inform the court who he had obtained for counsel byJanuary 2. 1969. Id. The court
told the defendant that if he had not obtained counsel by January 2, 1969, the court would appoint
counsel for him. Id
71, Id. The district court judge attempted to appoint counsel for Heasely, but the attorney that
was contacted refused. Id,
72./d. The trial judge had determined that appointment of counsel was only mandatory when a
defendant was charged with a felony and did not have funds to hire an attorney. Id The judge
explained that the reason he had offered to appoint counsel for Heasely was to insure that the case
would go to trial on the trial date. Id The judge concluded, however, that since Heasely was not
charged with a felony and he had made no showing that he did not have the funds to hire an attorney.
he was not entitled to court appointed counsel Id at 246-47.
73. Id at 248; jee N.D, C5-T. CODe 5 29-07-01.1 (1969) (in criminal proceeding, court may
appoint counsel for indigent defendant) (superceded); id. S 29-13-03 (1960) (defendant must be
appointed counsel before arraignment if he cannot afford an attorney) (superceded). These statutes
were replaced by rule 44 of the North Dakota Rules ofCriminal Procedure, which provides:
Absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, every indigent defendant is entitled to have
counsel appointed at public expense to represent him at every stage of the proceedings
from his initial appearance before a magistrate through appeal in the courts of this
state in all felony cases. Absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, every indigent
defendant is entitled to have counsel appointed at public expense to represent him at
every stage of the proceedings from his initial appearance before a magistrate through
appeal in the courts of this state in all non-felony cases unless the magistrate has
determined that sentence upon conviction will not include imprisonment. The court
shall appoint counsel to represent a defendant at the defendant's expense if the
defendant is unable to secure the assistance of counsel and is not indigent.
N.D.R. CriM. P, 44.
74. See Heastly, 180 N.W.2d at 249; tee N.D. CENT. CoDI. S 29-07-01.1 (1969) (court shall
determine if person is needy and appoint counsel, and may appoint counsel whenever reasonable)
(superceded).
75. SeeHasely, 180 N.W.2d at 249.
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The North Dakota Supreme Court did not address the use of
prior uncounseled misdemeanor convictions for enhancement
purposes until State v. Orr.76 Orr contended that his uncounseled
1982 DUI conviction could not be used to enhance the punishment
for his subsequent DUI conviction in 1984 because he had not
waived his right to counsel before pleading guilty to the earlier DUI
charge.7 7 The State argued that Orr's previous uncounseled
conviction could be used to enhance the punishment for his
subsequent conviction because Orr's first offense was not
punishable by more than six months imprisonment.7 8
Initially the North Dakota Supreme Court determined that the
county court had sentenced Orr to jail only because he was a second
offender.79 The supreme court then considered whether Orr had
validly waived his right to counsel in the prior municipal court DUI
trial.8 0 The county court bad determined that, since Orr had
validly waived his right to counsel in the municipal trial court, his
first conviction could be used for enhancement purposes.81 The
county court had presumed that Orr validly waived his right to
counsel even though the municipal court record did not
affirmatively indicate a waiver. 82 The North Dakota Supreme
76. 375 N.W 2d 171 (N.D. 1985).
77. State v. Orr, 375 N.W.2d 171, 173 (ND. 1985).
78. Id at 175; see Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 229 (1980) (right to counsel under federal
Constitution exists in misdemeanor cases if the offense is punishable by more than six months
imprisonment or the defendant is actually imprisoned). For a discussion of Baldasar, see supra notes
36-56 and accompanying text.
79. Orr, 375 N.W.2d at 173. The North Dakota Supreme court determined that the trial court
record indicated that Orr was sentenced as a second offender and not a first offender. Id The
supreme court determined that Orr was sentenced as a second offender because, as a matter of
practice, first offenders are not sentenced to jail in the county where Orr was prosecuted and because
Orr was sentenced to the minimum penalty for a second offender. Id. at 174; see N.D. CENT. CODE 5
39-08- 01(SXb) (Supp. 1985) (penalty for second DUI conviction). For the text of S 39-08-01(5) of the
North Dakota Century Code, see supra note 3.
80. Orr, 375 N.W.2d at 174.
81. Id
82. Id. The county court's conclusion that Orr had waived his right to counsel was based on
presumptions set forth in 5 31-11-03 of the North Dakota Century Code. Id.; see e.g., N.D. CENT.
CooE 5 31-11-03(15) (1976) (presumption that an official duty has been performed); id. 5 31-11-
03(17) (presumption that a judicial record, when not conclusive, correctly determines the rights of
the parties).
The court noted that the municipal court's record did not indicate that Orr waived his right to
counsel because municipal courts are not courts of record. Id. at 174 n.2; see N.D. CENT. CoD S 27-
01-01 (1976) (only the supreme court, district zourts, and county courts are courts of record). The
court also noted that the fact that municipal courts are not courts of record in North Dakota conflicts
with rule I I() of the North Dakota Rules of criminal Procedure. Orr, 375 N.W.2d at 174 n.2: see
N.D.R. CRIM. P. 1 l(f). Rule I 1(l) of the North 1Ekvta Rules ofCriminal Procedure provides:
A verbatim record of the proceedings at which the defendant enters a plea shall be
made and, if there is a plea of guilty, the record shall include, without limitation, the
court's advice to the defendant, the inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea including
any plea agreement, and the inquiry into the accuracy of a guilty plea.
Id. In his concurring opinion, Justice VandeWalle stated that the municipal court's failure to comply
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Court concluded that the county court erred when it presumed a
waiver of Orr's right to counsel. 83 The supreme court noted that
a plea of guilty involves the forfeiture of numerous constitutional
rights.8 4 Thus, in the context of a guilty plea, the court suggested
that a waiver of counsel restricts the exercise of numerous rights. 85
Because of the significance of the waiver of counsel in this context,
the court concluded that it was erroneous to infer a waiver of
counsel from the silent record.
8 6
The next issue the court addressed was whether Orr could be
sentenced as a second time offender when his prior conviction
resulted from an uncounseled guilty plea and there was no evidence
that Orr had waived his right to counsel.8 1 The court extensively
analyzed Baldasar v. Illinois.8 8 Because Baldasar was a plurality
opinion, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that the
decision must be interpreted on its narrowest grounds. 89 The court
analyzed the three concurrences in Baldasar.90  The court
determined that the opinions by Justices Marshall and Stewart
would preclude the use of Orr's prior conviction for enhancement
purposes because they stated that an unreliable prior conviction
could not enhance a defendant's punishment. 91 The court noted,
however, that pursuant tojustice Blackmun's opinion, Orr's prior
conviction could be used for enhancement purposes. 92 Justice
with rule I l(f) required the county court to disregard, for enhancement purposes, Orr's previous
conviction, Orr, 375 N.W.2d at 181 (VandeWalleJ., concurring).
83. Orr, 375 N.W,2d at 174.
84. Id. The North Dakota Supreme Court reasoned that, since a guilty plea itself is a conviction,
a defendant who pleads guilty relinquishes the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, the
right to a jury trial, and the right to confrontation. Id, The court indicated that, because a guilty plea
precludes the exercise of these important rights, a defendant should be afforded his or her right to
counsel before pleading guilty, &e id
85. See id
86 id. (citing State v. Hagemann, 326 NW .2(1861 (N . 1982)).
87. id. at 175. The prosecution argued that Orr should be sentenced to mandatory
imprisonment as a second DUI offender pursuant to 5 39-08-01(5Xb) of the North Dakota Century
Code. See id.; N. D. CENr. CODE S 39-08-01(5)(b) (Supp. 1985) (penalty for second DUI conviction).
For the text of 5 39-08-01(5)b), see lupra note 3.
88. See Orr, 375 N.W.2d at 175; Baldaar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222 (1980), For a discussion of
Baldasar, see supra notes 36-56 and accompanying text.
89, Or, 375 N.W.2d at 175; met Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222 (1980) For a discussion of
B!dasar, see supra notes 36-56 and accompanying text. The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that
-[when a fragmented Court decided a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the
assent of five judges, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those
Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds," Orr, 375 N.W.2d at 175
(quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)).
90. e Orr, 375 N.W.2d at 175, 176; Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U-& 222, 224 (1980)(Stewart,.J.,
concurring); id- (Marshall, J, concurring); ad at 229 (Blackmun, J., concurring). For an
interpretation of the concurring opinions in Baldasar, see supra notes 45-56 and accompanying text.
91. Or, 375 N.W.2d at 176; ;ee Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 224 (1980) (Stewart, J.,
concurring); id. at 228 (Marshall,. J., concurring).
92. Or, 375 N.W.2d at 176, see Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 229 (1980) (Blackmun,J
concurring). For a discussion of Justice Blackmun's concurrence in RaIdasar, see supra notes 50-56
and accompanying text.
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Blackmun's opinion stated that a prior uncounseled conviction t',at
was not punishable by more than six months imprisonment and
that did not result in actual imprisonment could be used to enhance
punishment. 93 The court believed that Justice Blackmun's view
was the narrowest view in the Baldasar analysis. 94 Thus, the court
stated that Baldasar stands for the proposition that a prior
uncounseled misdemeanor conviction, which was punishable by
more than six months imprisonment or which resulted in actual
imprisonment, cannot be used to increase a prison term under an
enhancement statute.95 Because Orr's prior conviction was not
punishable by six months imprisonment and did not result in actual
imprisonment, use of the prior uncounseled misdemeanor
conviction for enhancement purposes was consistent with the
United States Constitution. 96
The court then addressed whether subsection 39-08-01(5) of
the North Dakota Century Code was an enhancement statute.
97
The State contended that Orr's previous conviction could be used
to increase punishment because subsection 39-08-01(5) was not an
enhancement statute, but merely imposed a civil disability. 9
Therefore, the State argued that the focus of subsection 39-08-
01(5) was not on the reliability of the previous conviction, but
rather on the mere fact of the conviction.99 The court noted that,
93, Orr, 375 N. W 2d at 176, ee Baldaiarv. Illinois. 446 U.S. 222,229-30(1980 (Bliat ktun. J.,
concurring) (offense punishable by nore than stx months imprisonment or resulting in actual
imprisonment cannot be used] for enhancement purposes), For a disc ussion oflJusi e Blacknmun's
concurrence in Baldarsa, see mpra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
94 Orr, 375 N W. 2d at 176; 5re Baldasar v Illinois. 446 U. S 222, 229 (19801) (lBlackmun...
concurring). For a discussion of justice Blackmun's concurrence in Baldaar. see supra notes 50-50,
and accompanying text.
95. Orr, 375 N. W. 2d at 176" te Baldasar v Illinois, 446 U, S 222 (1980 For a clist ussioi of
Bablasar. see cpra notes 36-56 and acompanying text.
96. Orr, 375 N\V 2d at 176; see U-S Co'sT. amend VI (right to counsel)y For the text of lit
sixth amendment to the U nited States Constitution. see upra note 8.
97 Orr, 375 N\W,2d at 177; sw NA). Cr-Sf. COtE S 39-08-015 iSupp. 1985) (providint
graduated penalties for sucessive )UI convictions). For the text of $ 39-08-01(5 of the Norif
Dakota Century Code, see mpra note 3,
98- Orr, 375 NW.2d at 177. t e ND. CxIT. Coot S 39-08-0151 (Supp. 1985) (providint
graduated penalties for successive DUI convictions). For the text of S 39-08-01(5) of the Norti
Dakota Centurv Code, see tpra note 3.
99. Orr, 375 N.W.2d at 177. The State argued that the North Dakota Supreme Court's decisiot
was controlled by Lewis t. rnitedStatef Id at 176-77; see Lewis v. United States. 445 U S. 55 (1980)
In Leain the defendant was convicted ofa felony in 1961 and was subsequently charged with violatint
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street Act, Lewri5, 445 U.S- at 56-57; see 18 U.S-C- app. S 120,
(1982 & Supp. I1 1985) (firearm provision of Omnibus Act), The Omnibus Act prohibited convictec
felons from receiving, possessing, or transporting any firearms, id The defendant claimed that hi
1961 conviction was obtained in violation of the sixth amendment right to counsel and, therefore
could not support a conviction pursuant to the Omnibus Act. Leitsi. 445 U.S. at .- 58; see U.S
CONST. amend. VI (right to counsel). For the text of the sixth amendment to the United State
Constitution, see Mrpra note 8. The Court reasoned that the federal gun laws focused on the mere fac
of a conviction and not on the reliability of a conviction, in order to make firearms unavailable t.
potentially dangerous people. Lotrit, 445 U.S. at 67. The United States Supreme Court determinet
that the Omnibus Act did not enhance punishment on account of a prior conviction, but onl
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pursuant to subsection 39-08-01(5), punishment is increased for a
second, third, or fourth offense.' 00  The court stated that
punishment is increased because a repeat offense is considered a
more serious crime requiring harsher punishment. 0 1 Therefore,
the court concluded that subsection 39-08-01(5) is clearly an
enhancement statute, which focuses on the reliability of the first
conviction and not on the mere fact of conviction. 1
02
After determining that Baldasar did not preclude the use of
Orr's prior DUI conviction, and that subsection 39-08-01(5) is an
enhancement statute, the court considered whether the trial court's
use of Orr's prior uncounseled conviction for enhancement
purposes was prohibited pursuant to article I, section 12 of
the North Dakota Constitution, which guarantees an accused the
right to counsel.'0 3 The court noted that a defendant's right to
counsel guarantees, or at least facilitates, the best outcome for the
defendant.' 04 The court stated that uncounseled convictions are too
unreliable to support the sanction of imprisonment.10 5 The court
enforced a civil disability through criminal sanctions. Id In Orr the State asserted that, similar to the
Omnibus Act, 5 39-08-01(5) of the North Dakota Century Code did not enhance punishment due to
a past DUI conviction, but rather, merely imposed a civil disability. Orr, 375 N.W,2d at 177 itu
N.D. CxT. Coo 5 39-08-01(5)(Supp. 1985) (graduated penalties for successive DUI convictions).
For the text of S 39-08-01(5) of the North Dakota Century Code, see supra note 3.
100. Orr, 375 N.W-2d at 177, we NJD) C x-. Core, J 39-08 t)1(5) (Supp. 1985) (graduated
penalties for successive DUI convictions), For the text of S 39-08-01(5) o' the North l)akota Century
Code, see supra note 3,
101, Orr, 375 N.W.2d at 177,
102. Id Justice VandteWalle was not convinced that 5 39- 08-01(5) of the North Dakota Century
Code is an enhancemert statute, Id at 180 (VandeWalle. J., concurring). He expressed doubts
regarding the Validity of a distinction between civii disabilities and enhan cd punishment as a result
of a prior conviction. Id. Justice VandeWalle also noted that if a distinction existed, S 39-08-01(5)
may -not enhance punishment on account of the prior conviction but rather enforces an 'essentially
civil disability through a criminal sanction' - keeping the drunk driver oft the road'" ld, see N D
CENT. CoDE 5 39-08-01(5) (Supp. 1985) (punishments for DUI offi'nses). For the text of 5 39-08-
01(5) of the North Dakota Century Code, see supra note 3-
103, See Orr, 375 NW 2d at 177: see N.D. C-oxsT art. 1, 5 12. For the text of article I. S 12 of the
North Dakota Constitution, see supra note 8. The North Dakota Supreme Court has ret ognized that
the North )akota Constitution may aflord more protection of rights to individuals than does the
United States Constitution. Orr, 375 NAW 2d at 178 n.6; see City of Bismarck v Altevogt. 353
N.W.2d 760, 766 (ND. 1980) (the North Dakota Constitution can provide greater protection thian
the United States Constitution), Justice VandeWalle, however, was not convinced that the North
Dakota Constitution provides any greater protection than the United States Constitution with
respect to the right to counsel. Orr, 375 N.W°2d at 180(VandecAalle, c.oncurring). He stated that
the question wshether the North Dakota Constitution's right to counsel provision provides greater
protection than the United States Constitution's right to counsel should have been saved for a later
day. ld. Justice VandeWalle, however, did concur with the majority, because he concluded that the
municipal court's violation of rule I (f) of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure was
sufficient to preclude the use of Orr's previous uncounseled conviction for enhancement purposes.
Id. at 181. see N.D. R. CRist. P. I l(f) (requiring the court to keep a record ol-any proceeding at which
i plea is entered). For the text of rule I 1(f). see supra note 82.
104 Orr, 375 N.W,2d at 178,
105. Id. The North Dakota Supreme Court determined that an uncounseled conviction was too
unreliable to support imprisonment because uncounseled convictions often do not acurately reflect
the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Id at 178 n.7. The court stated: "Left without the aid of
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reasoned that simply because Orr's second conviction was valid,
the second conviction did not confer any reliability on his prior
uncounseled conviction.' 0 6 In addition, because the defect in Orr's
prior conviction was the denial of counsel, the court stated that Orr
would be deprived of his right to counsel again if he were
imprisoned solely because of his uncounseled conviction.
0 7
Therefore, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that the
enhancement of Orr's punishment solely because of his prior
uncounseled conviction violated article I, section 12 of the
North Dakota Constitution. 08
The Orr decision will have a substantial impact on North
Dakota municipal courts. Municipal courts, which are not courts of
record, must now meet certain requirements if a prior conviction is
to be used to enhance the penalty for a subsequent conviction. 0 9
Municipal courts must either obtain a valid waiver of counsel on
record, ?fford a nonindigent defendant the opportunity to obtain
counsel, or appoint counsel for indigent defendants regardless of
the penalty imposed.' 10 Although this broadening of the right to
counsel for defendants who cannot afford an attorney will impose
counsel an accused may be put on trial without a proper charge, and consicted upon nulompetent
evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible," Id kciting Powell v
Alabama, 287 U, S 45, 69 (1932)).
106. Id, at 178, The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that a first conviction in which a
defendant was not provided with the right to counsel was too unreliable to support the sanction of
imprisonment. Se id The court reasoned that the mere fact that Orr was validly convicted on a
second charge did not confer any reliability on his first conviction. Id Therefore, the court concluded
that an uncounseled misdemeanor could not support the punishment of imprisonment whether the
imprisonment was the result of a first or second conviction. id
107. Id (citing Burgett v. Texas. 389 U.S. 109, 115 (1967)). In Burfelt the United States
Supreme Court determined that a prior felony conviction was presumed void arid oulc not be used
for enhancement purposes when the record did not indicate that the defendant was affirded, or
waived, his right to counsel. Burgi, 389 U.S. at 114-15. The Court stated that, because the defect in
Burgett's first conviction was denial of the right to counsel, use of the uncounseled conviction for
enhancement purposes would cause Burgett to suffer again from the deprivation of his right to
counsel. Id. at 115.
The North Dakota Supreme Court determined that the State had the burden of proving the
validity of an uncounseled conviction so that it could be used for enhanctement purposes. Orr, 375
N.W.2d at 179. The court noted that a prior uncounseled conviction was presumed void, for
purposes of imprisonment, when there was not waiver on record. d (citing Burgett v. Texas, 389
UoS. 109, 114-15 (1967)). Therefore, the North Dakota Supreme Court determined that the State, in
attempting to imprison Orr as a second offender based on his prior, presumptively void uncounseled
conviction, had the burden of proving the validity of the prior conviction for purposes of
imprisonment for the subsequent conviction. Id. The court noted that the State could rely on parol or
other evidence indicating that Orr had voluntarily waived his right to counsel, but that the State had
failed to do so. Id, at 180.
108. 0r, 375 N.W.2d at 178, .see N.D. CossT. art. 1, 5 12. For the text of article 1, S 12 of the
North Dakota Constitution, see supra note 8.
109. See Orr, 375 N.W.2d at 179; N.D. CENT. CODE S 27-01-01 (Supp. 1985) (municipal courts
ar not listed as courts of record).
110. Orr, 375 N.W.2d at 179. See NORTH DAKOrA STATE SUPREME CoURt. NoRTH DAKOTA
MUNiCIPAL COURT BENCH BoOK 32-33 (1984) (advising municipal courts to carefully record a
defendant's waiver of counsel to ensure that a conviction will be valid for enhancement purposes).
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an economic burden on the state, it is a significant step in the
protection of an indigent defendant's rights under the North
Dakota Constitution.1 t
PATRICK STEVENS
111. See On, 375 N.W.2d at 179. The North Dakota Supreme Court, justifying the additional
expenditures needed to meet the requirements of the North Dakota Constitution's right to counsel,
stated:
While this may constitute an economic burden, our constitution must prevail .... We
recognize the concentrated legislative effort to deter those who endanger us all by their
drinking and driving. We believe that promotion of such a strong public policy merits
the necessary allocation of public funds to pass constitutional muster. Of course not all
DUI defendants are indigent and not all DUI violations will recur. For those that are
and do, we can only ascribe to the principle that our constitution applies to ever-
changing needs and problems facing society and implementation of its edicts may
often require varying and innovative adaptions.
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